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Abstract 
The terror attack on the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in January 2015 serves 
to explore the role of religion and secularism in mediated public spheres. We argue that 
deliberative theory, including its recent criticisms and extensions, helps navigate normative 
dilemmas presented by the attacks. From a deliberative perspective journalists should reprint 
Charlie cartoons that are perceived by Muslims as insulting and incendiary only if this fulfills a 
real need for public reflection and enlightenment. Media and the wider public should engage in 
differentiated solidarity with Charlie Hebdo, help transfer the hidden argumentative potential of 
its cartoons into the realm of truly argumentative discourse and engage in meta-deliberation that 
explicitly reflects the contexts and rules for public debate.  
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SHOULD WE BE CHARLIE?  
A DELIBERATIVE TAKE ON RELIGION AND SECULARISM IN MEDIATED 
PUBLIC SPHERES 
We live in a “religio-secular age” (Marty, 2003; Miller, 2008).  Different religions and 
different variants of secularism coexist (see Göle, 2010), certainly on a global scale but often 
even in individual societies.  This situation can be explosive as the terror attacks on the satirical 
magazine Charlie Hebdo as well as on Jews and law enforcement officers in Paris on January 7, 
2015 sadly remind us.  Such violent attacks are extreme symptoms of a communication 
breakdown or at least of the absence of camp-bridging exchange. Many contemporary conflicts 
are hard to solve because the parties involved construct their disagreement as a dispute between 
irreconcilable religious convictions and worldviews.  The deep societal divisions underlying 
these conflicts may run between adherents of different religious faiths, or between religious 
fundamentalists and more or less militant secularists.  Along both divides people may eschew 
communication with members of the opposing camp altogether or they may not engage in truly 
open listening but in distrustful and hostile exchanges (Luskin, O’Flynn, Fishkin, & Russell, 
2014).  We wish to argue that theories of deliberation provide a uniquely valuable set of 
conceptual tools for understanding and resolving such deep conflicts in divided societies. These 
tools have been used extensively in studies of mediated public deliberation as well (Rinke, in 
press).  
One particularly important conceptual tool is the concept of the deliberative system as 
developed by Mansbridge et al. (2012).  A deliberative system is “a loosely coupled group of 
institutions and practices” (p. 22) that should seek truth, establish mutual respect and facilitate 
inclusive democratic decision-making.  Using these three functions in order to evaluate the 
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quality of the deliberative system helps put the contributions of single parts of the system into 
perspective.  Mansbridge et al. attribute a broadly connective role to the media because they 
serve as “the major links to and among the citizenry within a deliberative system” (p. 22). 
Mediated deliberation primarily fulfills the first two functions, truth-seeking and respect, and is 
therefore understood as a form of constructive engagement openly available to everybody in a 
mediated public sphere. For the purposes of this paper we neither look at the decision-making 
function of deliberation nor at forms of mediated deliberation that are confined to members of 
particular organizations or participants of specific deliberative experiments. 
Deliberative democratic theory has traditionally focused on cases of moral disagreement, 
including religiously charged societal conflicts like the Charlie Hebdo case discussed below, and 
contemplated ways to deal with such cases in a more compelling fashion than important 
alternative theoretical options, particularly the classical liberal and agonistic models of 
democracy (Ellis, 2012; for helpful distinctions see, e.g., Baker, 2002; Ferree, Gamson, 
Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002). The classical liberal model features an aggregative concept of 
democracy and is therefore focused on free and equal elections as quintessential democratic 
mechanisms of interest aggregation (Ferree et al. 2002, pp.206-210). One recurring criticism of 
this model has been its incapacity to productively deal with deep moral conflict because it carries 
the obvious risk of a religious (or any other) minority systematically losing out when political 
decisions are made. The model offers little prescription for dealing with social pluralism other 
than for citizens in public discourse to altogether bracket their particular identities and hide them 
behind a “veil of ignorance” (e.g., Rawls, 1971). In contrast, the deliberative model of 
democracy promises at least some measure of protection against continued political domination 
by a particular religious majority through the requirement for good, public reasons to grant 
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legitimacy to collectively binding political outcomes (e.g., Lafont, 2014). Which kinds of 
reasons should be deemed acceptable is, of course, a matter of philosophical controversy and 
beyond the scope of this essay. For our purposes, it will suffice to say that the public justification 
requirement of deliberative democracy gives it an edge over aggregative concepts of democracy 
when it comes to the prospects for a productive processing of deep moral conflicts. 
Likewise, while agonistic theorists have generated a number of productive critiques that 
have improved the capacity of the deliberative model to accommodate deep moral conflict (for 
details, see below), agonistic models themselves offer little by way of accommodating different 
types of disagreement. Although antagonistic conflicts lie at the heart of their notion of 
democracy, agonists do not provide much guidance with regard to their nature, origin, and 
possible accommodation (Erman, 2009) because they construe them as fundamentally 
irreconcilable. Deliberative democratic theory, in contrast, has been crafted by its proponents as 
the normative model that most directly tackles the problems associated with intractable, moral 
conflicts. Central works in deliberative theory take as their starting point the facts of social 
pluralism and moral conflict and see moral discussion as central to political life and the original 
problem of democracy (e.g., Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). Consequently, deliberative theory 
has focused on ways of making “distinctly moral compromises” possible by developing 
principles and standards for the practice of public deliberation. The underlying idea is that only 
such deliberation may engender genuine compromise and ensure cooperation among members of 
opposed moral camps (e.g., Bohman, 1996). 
The case of Charlie Hebdo is an example of a complex moral conflict involving religious 
and secular identities, and scholars of deliberative democracy have in recent years examined 
precisely such conflicts in theoretical terms. In the process, modern deliberative democratic 
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theory has converged on a position of “open secularism” in which religious reasons are 
welcomed into public debate while upholding requirements for mutual respect and the necessity 
for public policy arrangements to be accepted as just by all reasonable citizens (e.g., Bohman & 
Richardson, 2009; Chambers, 2010; also Habermas, 2006). In this essay, we aim to apply these 
insights to the Charlie case and show how deliberative democratic theory may inform our 
assessment of this concrete moral conflict and how the theory, in turn, may be informed by the 
case. 
Mediated deliberation as an analytical and practical tool for engaging with deep religio-
secular divides is made up of two major components: Mediated contestation as a robust public 
process of working out differences between groups and political discourse cultures as the 
patterns of production, reception, and appropriation of political communication, on which these 
contestatory practices rely (see Hepp & Wessler, 2009). 
Mediated Contestation 
Deliberative theory holds that mediated contestation may help realize principles of 
political equality, but only if it meets the core requirements of broad inclusion and moderation.  
Moderation and inclusion constitute independent and reconcilable requirements of effective 
political equality. In a deliberative framework, moderation is understood as the tendency to 
attune one’s preferences vis-à-vis fellow citizens who are seen as possessing equal political 
standing and legitimacy. It entails the requirement to offer reasons for one’s own preferences as 
well as to attend carefully to the opposing points of view, that is, to practice justification and 
reciprocity. Therefore, moderation relates to the ethical function of establishing mutual respect as 
introduced by Mansbridge et al. (2012). This function can be further differentiated using Gastil’s 
(2008, p. 52) criteria of mediated deliberation as a social process. Apart from its analytical 
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benefits mediated deliberation, according to Gastil, should fulfill four social criteria: adequate 
distribution of speaking opportunities; mutual comprehension; the consideration of other ideas 
and experiences; and respect toward other participants. Especially the last three criteria define a 
form of communication that is also often labeled “dialogue”. Mediated deliberation thus includes 
the forms of conciliatory dialogue that, for example, Pearce and Littlejohn (1997) and Remland, 
Jones, Foeman, and Arévalo (2014) have studied in the context of moral conflicts. Dialogues of 
this kind have the power to bridge differences between conflict parties through respectful, 
moderate exchanges and can thus be seen as examples of deliberation. 
The inclusion requirement, on the other hand, translates into a need for publicity. Only if 
the discursive processes guiding political decision are publicized, may the cross-cutting interests 
present in a divided society be moderated – a process that ensures public accountability, a 
broadly shared sense of inclusion among members of different societal camps and, ultimately, 
the legitimacy of political decisions (O’Flynn, 2007). Other authors have grouped these core 
criteria in slightly different ways (see, for example Coe, Kenski, & Rains, 2014; Ferree et al., 
2002; Rinke, Wessler, Löb, & Weinmann, 2013), but the aspects mentioned do constitute the 
essential normative components of mediated deliberation. 
The adequacy of Habermas’ (e.g., 1994, 1996) original deliberative framework to process 
difference and deep divides through public communication has been doubted especially from an 
agonistic point of view.  Following Mouffe (1999) and Sanders (1997, SSí), the 
deliberative demand for civil speech and the focus on fact-based argumentation systematically 
favors some groups over others.  According to these critics, this contradicts the deliberative 
claim for broad inclusion of everybody affected by an issue in the discussion and neglects the 
putative benefits of passions and emotions for democratic discourse (Mouffe, 1999, pp. 
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rejected by representatives of the agonistic perspective due to its alleged exclusionary character 
(Mouffe, 1999; Sanders, 1997). 
However, while the agonistic criticism raises important issues, some of its representatives 
fail to recognize changes within the deliberative framework which take up and respond to the 
agonistic criticism.  For example, Peters (2008) proposes to replace personal equality as a basis 
of inclusion by a principle of openness or equal opportunity for issues, perspectives, 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVLGHDVDQGDUJXPHQWVSSޤ<RXQJDJUHHVZLWKWKHDJRQLVWLF
critics that the criteria of moderate and civil speech negatively affect the claim for broad 
inclusion because they discriminate against speech by underprivileged groups and minorities.  
But instead of discarding the deliberative perspective entirely she suggests including alternative 
forms of communication such as greeting, rhetoric and storytelling because they “supplement 
argument by providing ways of speaking across difference in the absence of significant shared 
understandings” (p. 129).  Even though the deliberative paradigm favors fact-based reasoning in 
civil and respectful discussion over passionate and emotional public contestation, this does not 
imply that these alternative forms of communication are seen as illegitimate and should be 
excluded from the discourse.  Rather, the deliberative perspective recognizes the benefits of 
these alternative forms of communication for a deliberative discourse, provided that they are 
eventually transformed into rational arguments in order to realize their full deliberative potential 
(Habermas, 1996, p. 381).  Concerning the demand for reaching a consensus, some scholars who 
support the deliberative paradigm have incorporated the agonistic criticism and shifted to the 
demand for reasoned dissent instead of substantive agreement (e.g., Wessler & Schultz, 2007).  
Even further, Dryzek (2005) responds to the agonistic criticism in relation to deep value conflicts 
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by broadening the deliberative framework, offering conditions under which the deliberative 
perspective is flexible and robust enough to process even these divides. In our view, thus, 
deliberative theory addresses the complexity of social reality in a more reasonable way than the 
agonistic perspective precisely because it is open for non-argumentative forms of communication 
and alternative idioms, albeit on a shared foundation of procedural fairness and commitment to 
justifiable solutions. 
Political Discourse Cultures 
Mediated contestation does not flourish in a vacuum. It is rooted and embedded in  
“social practices and institutional structures that impact the character of the public sphere 
and the mode of cultural reproduction. Put differently: public spheres have a social and 
cultural foundation that extends well beyond the framework of media markets and media 
organizations. Many other structures that are of importance affect intellectual production 
and its reception, collective interests and problem definition. These structures include 
educational and research facilities, journalism and other professions, networks and 
cliques of producers of cultural and intellectual property, structures for interest 
articulation and aggregation such as political parties, interest groups and social 
organizations and milieus.” (Peters, 2008, p. 246) 
We concur with Peters’s non-mediacentric perspective that directs our attention to the 
deep social and cultural foundations of mediated contestation. These foundations jointly 
constitute the framework in which mediated contestation, and public communication more 
generally, takes concrete shape. The cultural component of these foundations consists of the 
political discourse culture of a particular collectivity. Political discourse cultures represent the 
ensemble of patterns (i.e. classification systems, and discursive formations) to which members of 
SHOULD WE BE CHARLIE?                       10 
a specific group refer in order to give meaning to political action (Hepp & Wessler, 2009, p. 
184). This definition comprises a mental element (classification systems), a textual component 
(discursive formations) as well as a pragmatic aspect (the everyday practice of meaning 
construction) (Hepp, Brüggemann, Kleinen-von Königslöw, Lingenberg, & Möller, 2012, pp. 
32ޤ33). If we transpose this three-dimensional concept to the issue of deep religio-secular 
divides, we can ask which classification systems, mediated discursive formations and meaning-
making practices support or stifle camp-bridging communication. This question pertains to both 
argumentative exchanges between camps in a more narrow sense and ritual enactments of 
community as experienced in political media events more broadly. 
To be sure, there are dangers at both ends of the continuum. On the one hand, a political 
discourse culture can be too single-minded to accommodate meaningful cultural and religious 
difference, thus fostering negative stereotyping and aggressive “othering.” On the other hand a 
political discourse culture can be fragmented into separate spheres of public discourse so that 
discursive encounters across the divide are avoided altogether. While fragmentation seems 
preferable to oppressive unity at first sight, the avoidance of communication across camps is 
likely to create a lack of understanding and will engender free-floating mutual misconceptions in 
the long run. 
It seems, therefore, that divided societies are condemned to developing models situated 
more in the middle of the continuum that combine two things in creative ways: (a) a more or less 
extended zone of indifference between the divided communities; not every cultural or religious 
belief or practice should always be commented on by the other side; and (b) sites and occasions 
for mutual discursive engagement including the opportunity to criticize members on the other 
side. Ironically, the emergence of indifference presupposes at least a certain element of 
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secularism in the political discourse culture, whatever its specific form (see Göle, 2010). And 
this cultural element is more easily sustained in institutional settings that safeguard religious 
freedom and freedom of expression. Previous research has shown that power-sharing political 
institutions and camp-bridging media consumed by members on both side of the divide help 
mitigate conflicts, including religious and religio-secular strife (e.g., Wessler & Rinke, 2014; 
Wolfsfeld, 2004).  
Political media events represent a particularly potent element of political discourse 
cultures with acute consequences for cross-camp contestation. Media events are public 
performances co-produced by media that command exceptional public attention and disrupt 
societal routines. But they can only function if the mediated performances produced (textual 
element) offer distinctions between “us” and “them” (the mental component) that resonant with 
and are appropriated by large audiences (the pragmatic component). By considering media event 
performances as an integral part of mediated contestation in situations of deep division we 
explicitly extend the framework originally associated with the deliberative tradition. We 
emphasize the community-generating capacities of political media events and thus offer a 
conception of media events that differs from both its “inventors” and recent critics. 
Originally conceived by Dayan and Katz (1992) as the “high holidays of mass 
communication” media events were thought to offer powerful occasions for celebrating and 
experiencing national unity, occasions at which societal conflicts are suspended and common 
ground is emphasized. This ceremonial conception of media events is narrow and seems 
outdated. Dayan (2010, p. 26) has emphasized that media events are subject to a logic of 
“conflictualization.” Katz and Liebes (2010) have introduced terror, disaster and war as 
additional types of media events and have emphasized their disruptive qualities. These revisions 
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have prompted some critics to abandon the ritual enactment and experience of specific 
communities as a defining criterion of media events altogether. Couldry (2003, p.65), for 
example, criticizes the neo-Durkheimian thinking in Dayan and Katz’s original account and 
discards with it any reference to community in favor of analyzing media events as feeding into 
the “myth of the mediated centre,” i.e. the media’s self-construal as society’s symbolic centre. 
The analysis of the integrating or disintegrating effects of media events in relation to concrete 
groups in society is thus abandoned for an analysis of how the media come to claim and uphold 
their symbolic power vis-à-vis other power centers in society. While we share the critical 
intention of uncovering the hidden construction rules of media event performances, we wish to 
retain the enactment and experience of specific communities as a central element in media event 
analysis, particularly as we aim to understand divided societies. 
Brüggemann and Wessler (2014) offer an overarching typology of media events that 
focuses on their different modes of experience, ranging from celebration through mourning and 
consoling to revolting. Whatever the dominant experience that a particular media event conjures 
up, in the context of religio-secular divides it is paramount whether the experience is shared 
across divides or disputed, and whether certain groups are victimized or marginalized. Taking 
the terror attack on Charlie Hebdo as an example, it makes all the difference whether the event is 
celebrated by some groups and deplored by others and subsequently used to bolster up 
exclusionary ethnic identifications and mutual stereotypes, or whether it is constructed as an 
occasion for unified outrage at the aggressors and for mourning across the religious divide. The 
latter alternative, even it is does not primarily entail argumentation, lies at the heart of what 
public deliberation is about. In addition, recognizing the global diversity of political discourse 
cultures broadens our analytical horizon and allows us to understand why globally 
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communicated events charged with religio-secular conflict tend to entail vastly different 
collective reactions in different parts of the world (think, for example, of the torching of 
Christian churches in Niger by Muslim mobs a week after the attack on Charlie Hebdo out of 
anger at the insult seen in their Muhammad caricatures). With such a focus media event analysis 
remains an important tool in understanding the nature of political discourse cultures and their 
interactions across the globe. 
Case Study: Should We Be Charlie? 
The events in Paris in January 2015 may be interpreted as expressions of a rivalry 
between the religious and the secular, in which both are confronted with one another and 
recomposed in the process (Göle, 2010, p. 52).  Drawing on the values of inclusion and 
moderation as well as the importance of political discourse cultures, especially in our 
increasingly transnational media systems, deliberation theory allows us to identify and provide 
theoretically grounded answers to important normative dilemmas that emerged for citizens, 
elites, and media in the events’ aftermath. 
The “right to offend” versus deliberative self-restraint 
The first dilemma concerns the question of whether newspapers and online media around 
the world should reprint and repost Charlie Hebdo cartoons that would be found offensive by 
large groups of Muslims. The popular discourse surrounding this question mainly revolved 
around two frames: On the one hand a libertarian frame that asserted a “right to offend,” cast as 
an extension of the more general right to freedom of speech, and on the other hand a more 
conciliatory frame that asserted the “right not to get offended,” based on an acute awareness of 
the sensitivities of Muslim communities domestically and around the globe. These frames 
dominated Western public discourse after the Charlie Hebdo attacks, much like after previous 
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Muslim-related freedom of speech controversies (Mondal, 2014). Fervent defenders of a “right to 
offend”, of course, regularly answered the question concerning reprinting Charlie Hebdo 
cartoons in the affirmative. The deliberative perspective, however, points to the limitations of 
this position: It is important for a vital public debate that this particular right exists, but it may be 
wise to exercise it with restraint in some situations, not out of fear but as a demonstrative act of 
non-offense that can potentially spawn respect. ). The deliberative perspective thus challenges 
the dichotomy suggested by routine rights-based discourse and advances a substantive 
understanding of what desirable public discourse should look like.i 
This interpretation is supported by the empirical observation that asserting freedom of 
speech, including the right to offend, in a conspicuous show of one’s willingness and ability to 
use it without restraint, does indeed polarize societies and makes camp-bridging co-orientation 
and deliberation less likely. As an example, take the “Muhammad Cartoons Affair” sparked by 
the publication of 12 cartoons about the Prophet Muhammad by the Danish newspaper Jyllands-
Posten in 2005. The publication of these cartoons set in motion a spiral of reciprocal 
confrontation, during which false oppositions of Islam and a “European culture” emerged and 
were asserted (Henkel, 2006, p. 7). The publication of these cartoons, instrumentalized as they 
became by governments and other agents, sparked significant outrage among Muslim 
communities around the world. Importantly and unlike most mass media would have it, this 
reaction of Muslims was not so much a claim for a “special treatment” of their religion and 
community, but rather incited by a particularly inflammatory, racialized depiction of the Prophet 
and Muslims in these cartoons that violated the deliberative principle of equality (Hussain, 
2007). Not only did the particular quality of the depictions lead to spontaneous outrage, but also 
to mounting perceptions among Muslims of widespread Western islamophobia (Webman, 2012). 
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Conversely, the Cartoons Affair also left its mark on Western publics, which in the 
aftermath engaged in and with a discourse that furthered Western prejudice towards Muslims 
through a variety of common “othering” techniques (e.g., Creutz-Kämppi, 2008). A further 
problem exemplified by the Cartoons Affair is that in today’s media environment such 
controversies almost necessarily become transnational in nature. Such transnational conflicts, 
while they escalate and lead to societal polarization along ethnocultural lines, are rarely ever 
truly resolved (Mondal, 2014, p. 147). They may fade out after some time, yet they continue to 
linger and constitute a latent potential for similar conflicts to later resurge with even greater 
intensity, foregoing the processes of consensus-building or at least reasonable disagreement that 
are emphasized in theories of deliberative democracy (e.g., Guttman & Thompson, 2000). 
Deliberative theory thus suggests that journalists should not opt to publish material if it 
can reasonably be expected to be perceived as insulting and incendiary by others and does not in 
the first place fulfill a real need for public reflection (see also Nacos & Torres-Reyna, 2007, p. 
124). Of course, in democratic societies a “Ministry of Discourse Quality” neither exists nor 
should exist that authoritatively judges the offensive potential of public speech for its citizens. 
Deliberative theory suggests that moderation is built on collective and voluntary self-restraint 
that is anchored in a political discourse culture revolving around respect for those different from 
oneself. 
Public demonstration of solidarity and meta-deliberation 
Another normative dilemma relates to the issue whether citizens, elites, and journalists 
should publicly identify themselves with Charlie Hebdo as in the slogan “Je suis Charlie/Nous 
sommes Charlie” during mass demonstrations and on social media. While such identification 
does not constitute an argumentative engagement in the strict sense, deliberative theory suggests 
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that such universal public show of solidarity should be valued as a precondition for camp-
bridging deliberation.  Public solidarity may promote inclusion and integration, even across 
boundaries of political discourse cultures, and it does not only honor the victims and support the 
survivors but also mitigates the danger of hysterical reactions to the attacks through an 
experience of collective self-efficacy. Collective identification with the victims, as evidenced in 
people of different faiths joining the marches, may thus prepare the ground for reentering camp-
bridging deliberation. 
In the case of Charlie Hebdo, solidarity clearly affirmed the deliberative value of 
inclusion as enacted through the right to free speech for which Charlie came to stand. However, 
the dilemma becomes clearer if we consider how such solidarity relates to the deliberative value 
of moderation. In essence, solidarity with Charlie meant hailing public communicators that came 
to represent an aggressive, potentially divisive secularism. Deliberative theory suggests that the 
best way to deal with this dilemma lies in public “meta-deliberation” (e.g., Thompson, 2008, p.  
515). Meta-deliberation is communication about the context and the rules for public debate, and 
there are examples for both aspects in the Charlie Hebdo debate. Much Internet-based 
communication outside France misinterpreted Charlie Hebdo as a right-wing, racist publication 
whereas the magazine is clearly part of the French secular left.  To mitigate communicative 
escalation, it is therefore helpful to explain and reflect on that variant of secularism and its 
societal context rather than to simply celebrate it.ii Apart from providing context, meta-
deliberation has also helped to publicly reflect on the rules of discussion by debating how 
freedom of expression and deliberative self-restraint can be balanced. A case in point here is the 
protest in May 2015 of some 200 PEN members against the conferral of the U.S. PEN’s 
“freedom of expression courage” award to Charlie Hebdo.iii Through public debates like this 
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meta-deliberation can be an important source of constant democratic innovation (Fung, 2012), 
and it can generate a pluralistic deliberative system that allows for the collective contemplation 
about how, if necessary, religio-secular systems should be changed. 
While the meta-deliberative process should, ideally, be open-ended, there is much to be 
said in favor of keeping a “post-secular balance between shared citizenship and cultural 
difference” (Habermas, 2008, p. 27). In such a balance aggressive secularism is rejected and a 
positive role for religion in the public sphere granted given that religious doctrines can serve as 
resources of moral intuitions not otherwise accessible to a secular society (Habermas, 2006). 
This view of a deliberative approach to religion in the public sphere corresponds to the 
conception of a “weakly secular” state (An-Na`im, 2010, p. 217-218). Such a state, religiously 
neutral but engaged in the coordination of the religious and the political, reserves a positive role 
for religion in public life, rather than trying to suppress and control it, and thus helps sustain the 
robust civil debates of pluralism. Such a model can be realized, for example, through national 
ethics commissions in which theologians of all faiths could be represented alongside non-
religious experts or through explicitly inter-religious worship during national commemorative 
events or preceding sessions of parliament etc.  
Such a deliberation-promoting form of secularism is, however, at least partly at odds with 
the secularism embodied by Charlie Hebdo. Deliberative theory would call for differentiated 
forms of public solidarity with Charlie that uphold freedom of expression while pointing to the 
detrimental effects of derogatory othering. And it points to the necessity to unearth the latent 
argumentative potential that vitriolic satire hides in its thorny shell. As Bernhard Peters (2008, p. 
144) writes, “[s]uch forms can – as barbs, the medium of bitter truth, or as revelations – serve as 
effective means for a critical public sphere. Implicitly, such criticism makes use of 
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argumentative foundations – but they depend upon a transfer into the realm of the discursive.” In 
this sense Charlie Hebdo caricatures often point to problems in the way religion is practiced in 
Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Their critical argumentative potential can be an important 
resource for public debate, and the potentially offensive form should be no excuse to ignore its 
substance altogether. But productive public debate should ultimately extend to a wider range of 
deliberative exchanges on the matters criticized as well as explicit meta-deliberations on the 
boundaries of public discourse as described above. From a deliberative perspective, therefore, 
rituals of public solidarity are important but insufficient and the general public should support 
but not wholly identify with Charlie Hebdo. We should thus be with Charlie, but not 
unconditionally be Charlie. 
Conclusion 
What, then, can we learn from the Charlie Hebdo case for a theory of mediated 
deliberation? First, by analyzing a prime example of both mediated contestation and public ritual 
we have come a fair bit closer to spelling out the role assigned to mediated communication in a 
deliberative democratic system. Some deliberative theorists mention the media as a potential site 
of deliberation, but tend to deride them at the same time for their seeming failure to actually 
produce deliberation (e.g., Mansbridge et al., 2012). In contrast, the Charlie Hebdo case 
highlights the deliberative potential of mediated crises that lies in the opportunity to symbolically 
draw inclusive boundaries in defense of central values and to foster substantive, moderate debate 
across lines of deep difference. It is an empirical question to which degree what types of media 
in which kind of political discourse culture are positioned to successfully perform these 
normative functions. But the Charlie Hebdo case serves as a reminder that deliberative theorists 
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should not write off the media when conceiving the deliberative system and that mediated 
deliberation can seek truth and foster respect under certain conditions. 
Secondly, Charlie Hebdo shows that insisting on the right to free expression is not 
enough when it comes to creating healthy democratic contestation. Voluntary self-restraint is not 
tantamount to censorship or cowardice. Conversely, it is also not sufficient to insist on a putative 
“right not to be offended” if this means worshiping your own sensitivities and ignoring the 
argumentative kernel enclosed in provocative and even offensive criticism. Deliberative theorists 
should insist on the deliberative values of inclusion and moderation enshrined in such rights 
claims rather than hailing the rights as such. 
Finally, the Charlie Hebdo case can serve to sensitize deliberative theorists to the role of 
non-argumentative forms of public discourse, such as media events with their community-
generating functions, in preparing and facilitating subsequent argumentative exchanges. An 
exclusively rationalistic account of deliberation would miss the role that public demonstrations 
of solidarity and of camp-bridging unity can have in spawning respect and the willingness to 
listen. Empirical deliberation researchers should move from single cases like the one we have 
presented here to a more systematic study of the legal, political, and cultural breeding grounds of 
mediated contestation in situations of deep division.  
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i
 Six months after the attack Charlie Hebdo’s editor, Laurent Sourisseau, used the same 
rights-based discourse in his announcement in the German magazine “stern” that the 
journal would stop drawing Muhammad: “We have drawn Muhammad to defend the 
principle that you can draw what you like. But it’s a bit strange: people expect that we 
exercise a freedom that essentially nobody else dares to use anymore. But we have done 
our job. We defended the right to caricature. Now it’s other people’s turn.“ [translation 
by the authors] While this position is highly understandable, it does not offer a 
substantive conception of public debate through satirical cartoons. 
ii
 See „No, Charlie Hebdo is not racist. Here’s why.“ by LorenzoA, posted on DailyKos, 
May 27, 2015 at 07:30 AM PDT 
iii
 See „After Protests, Charlie Hebdo Members Receive Standing Ovation at PEN Gala“ 
By Jennifer Schuessler, New York Times, May 6, 2015 
 
